The need for this historical perspective stems from the occasional inaccurate suggestion that the Guidelines are the work of elite high paid professionals, or the musings of academics with no grounding in actual practice. In his concurrence in Bobby v. Van Hook, 3 Justice Alito disparaged the Guidelines as having no "special relevance" to Sixth Amendment performance standards. 4 He described the ABA as a "private group with limited membership," whose views-"not to mention the views of the members of the advisory committee that formulated the 2003 Guidelines"-"do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar as a whole."
5 Thus, the Guidelines, in the Justice's opinion, do not merit a "privileged position" in determining the obligations of capital defense counsel. 6 No other Justice joined in this concurrence, but the Court's majority faulted the Sixth Circuit for judging trial counsel's performance in the 1980s based on revised Guidelines published in 2003 "without even pausing to consider whether they reflected the prevailing professional practice at the time of the trial." 7 Historical clarification is also particularly important today because of the funding crises in our courts, causing even less hostile jurists to express anxiety about how much justice we can afford. On the occasion of an event celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, 8 the landmark ruling recognizing that indigent defendants are entitled to a lawyer at public expense, Justice Kagan gave a speech reminding us that poor people are not entitled to "the best defense money can buy."
9 She resorted to the familiar automotive metaphor to remind everyone that a poor person's right to counsel means only an inexpensive defense-in enormous effort by the ABA Death Penalty Representation Project ("Project"), which recruited the advisory committee, worked with it, assisted contractors in drafting revisions and with Professor Eric Freedman in preparing the Commentary, and finally shepherding the revised Guidelines through the ABA's internal review process. The result is the singular accomplishment of the Project over the preceding decade.
3. 558 U.S. 16 North Carolina and Louisiana had attempted to eliminate jurors' unfettered discretion by making the death penalty mandatory for certain narrowly defined murders, but the high court declared their mandatory statutes unconstitutional. 17 In striking down the mandatory statutes, the Court explained that individualized sentencing is constitutionally required in capital cases:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It 10. Ramonas, supra note 9. treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death . . . . . . . . While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, [] requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
18
The new statutory frameworks of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, however, survived Supreme Court scrutiny. 19 All three statutes guaranteed that death-sentenced prisoners would have an automatic appeal to their highest state courts. 20 All three established bifurcated trials, with one phase to determine whether the defendant was guilty of the alleged capital murder, and a second phase to determine the sentence. 21 In Gregg v. Georgia, 22 the Court praised the framework proposed in the Model Penal Code in 1962, whereby jurors would be guided by defined aggravating factors, narrowing eligibility for the death penalty, and mitigating factors that would offer broad leeway to dispense mercy. 23 As Professor Craig Haney has astutely pointed out, "there was . . is to bifurcate the proceeding, abiding strictly by the rules of evidence until and unless there is a conviction, but once guilt has been determined opening the record to the further information that is relevant to sentence."). Once the Court approved the Georgia statute, "the [Model Penal Code] became the basis, essentially, for every American death penalty statute." MANDERY, supra note 1, at 306; see ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Guideline 10.11, at 1059 n.274 ("In fact, most statutory mitigating circumstances, which were typically adapted from the Model Penal Code, are 'imperfect' versions of first phase defenses such as insanity, diminished capacity, duress, and self-defense."). It should be noted, however, that this language was later explicitly withdrawn from the Model Penal Code. In 2009, the American Law Institute Council ("Institute") voted "overwhelmingly" to accept the resolution adopted by the Institute's membership at its annual meeting to withdraw the relevant section of the Model Penal Code "in light of the current intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment." See Press literally no mitigation whatsoever presented to the jurors" who had sentenced Troy Gregg to death, and this absence of mitigation was "apparently so insignificant to the Justices" that "not one of them saw fit to mention it anywhere in their opinions." 24 He notes the particular irony in Gregg, because "'mitigation' was explicitly identified as one of the key components in the new and improved death penalty statutes that the Court found constitutional." 25 It is not surprising that some lawyers were initially confused about what could be presented as mitigating evidence. In the syllabus of a 1978 "Strategy Seminar on Death Penalty Trials" in California, one veteran public defender wrote:
Most of the doubt and uncertainty lies within the penalty phase. Although strong arguments can be made for allowing the defendant to produce evidence going to such matters as common mercy, defendant's total value within the community, his character, history, and background, the more strict and severe interpretation is one that admits the production of evidence of only specifically enumerated factors. Large wars can be expected to be waged in that never-never land falling between paragraph one with its broad expansive admissions of proofs and paragraph five with its rather stringent limitations.
26
Just a few months later, the Supreme Court provided clarification in a case from Ohio. Sandra Lockett challenged the constitutionality of an Ohio statute because it did not permit the sentencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and relatively minor role in the crime. 27 The Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the Release sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 28 Meanwhile, practitioners in the South were aggressively developing strategies to investigate and present effective mitigating evidence-and embracing multidisciplinary teamwork as early as 1976. 29 Dennis N. Balske, an attorney then practicing with the Southern Poverty Law Center in Alabama, also stressed the need for teams in a 1979 law review article:
No attorney should ever solo a capital case. There are simply too many things going on for one attorney to manage. Moreover, it is difficult to maintain one's sanity under such intense pressure without the support of another attorney. Thus, as an absolute minimum, every capital case should have two defense attorneys.
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The article also emphasized the importance of investigation, 31 consistent theories in both phases, 32 and preparation of penalty phase strategy and evidence far in advance of trial, so that "rather than scurrying around to discover information to save your client, your job will consist of administering the most persuasive presentation possible from the wealth of information already accumulated, in such a way as to complement, through consistency, your trial presentation. 31. Balske, supra note 30, at 352; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, Guideline 11.4.1 (requiring that "independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase of a capital trial" should begin "immediately upon counsel's entry into the case and should be pursued expeditiously").
32. Balske, supra note 30, at 353; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, Guideline 11.7.1(A)-(B) (requiring counsel to formulate a defense theory "that will be effective through both phases," and seek to minimize inconsistencies).
33. Balske, supra note 30, at 353-54; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, Guideline 11.8.3(A) (requiring sentencing preparation to commence "immediately upon counsel's entry into the case").
the power of transformative stories of redemption, so he did not imagine mitigation as being limited to the client's pre-offense background: "Importantly, the life story must be complete. That is, it must include information up to the day of the sentencing hearing itself." 34 The details of teamwork also quickly evolved. It was not long before lawyers appreciated the value of having someone give undivided attention to the client and the development of mitigating evidence. One lawyer in California hired a former New York Times reporter to investigate the life history of his client. The reporter, Lacey Fosburgh, was teaching at the Journalism School at the University of California, Berkeley, and she had previously written Closing Time: The True Story of the "Goodbar" Murder, a best seller about a case that she had covered for the newspaper. 35 Her account of her experience assisting in the successful representation of a capital client was published in 1982:
[A] significant legal blind spot existed between the roles played by the private investigator and the psychiatrist, the two standard informationgetters in the trial process. Neither one was suited to the task at hand here-namely discovering and then communicating the complex human reality of the defendant's personality in a sympathetic way. . . . . Significantly, the defendant's personal history and family life, his obsessions, aspirations, hopes, and flaws, are rarely a matter of physical evidence. Instead they are both discovered and portrayed through narrative, incident, scene, memory, language, style, and even a whole array of intangibles like eye contact, body movement, patterns of speech-things that to a jury convey as much information, if not more, as any set of facts. But all of this is hard to recognize or develop, understand or systematize without someone on the defense team having it as his specific function. This person should have nothing else to do but work with the defendant, his family, friends, enemies, business associates and casual acquaintances, perhaps even duplicating some of what the private detective does, but going beyond that and looking for more. This takes a lot of time and patience. 36 34. Balske, supra note 30, at 357-58; see also ABA GUIDELINES (1989), supra note 2, Guideline 11.8.6(A)-(B) (noting that counsel should consider presenting evidence of the "rehabilitative potential of the client," in addition to information from his medical, educational, military, employment, family, and social history); see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1985) (evidence of positive jail adjustment is relevant as mitigation, even though it "would not relate specifically to petitioner's culpability for the crime he committed").
35. By the mid-1980s, there was also increasing recognition of the need for multidisciplinary teams, including nonlawyers, who would give fulltime attention to social history investigation. 37 In 1986, social workers Cessie Alfonso and Katharine Baur wrote about their experience in capital defense teams over the preceding five years, "bridg[ing] the gap" between attorneys and clients' families, fostering closer cooperation between clients and attorneys, and using psychosocial expertise to help shape the mitigation narrative.
38 Attorneys David C. Stebbins and Scott P. Kenney reiterated the importance of capital defense counsel being team players, and bluntly acknowledged that lawyers just do not have the "psycho-social" expertise that mitigation work requires. 39 They stressed the importance of parallel tracks of investigation: "Upon appointment to a capital case, two concurrent investigations should be begun by separate and distinct investigatory personnel. The criminal investigation is self-explanatory. A social investigation or social history is a creature of capital litigation, however, and is a key to a successful mitigation."
40 Stebbins and Kenney also noted how social history is the key to reliable mental health assessments in capital cases: "Without a complete social history, any psychological examination is incomplete and the resulting opinions, conclusions, or diagnoses are subject to severe scrutiny." 41 Another article in 1987 concluded: "The mitigation specialist is a professional who, as attorneys across the nation are recognizing, should be included and will be primary to the defense team."
42 These authors also stressed the importance of engaging the services of a mitigation specialist at the 37 outset of the case: "Since the penalty phase is always a possibility and the entire case strategy needs to be planned and prepared around mitigation, the mitigation specialist should be obtained as soon as the attorney is retained or assigned." 43 Guidance from the Supreme Court stressed the importance of understanding what shaped the capital client in his developmental years. Monty Lee Eddings was sixteen when he killed an Oklahoma highway patrol officer. 44 He was certified to stand trial as an adult, and pled nolo contendere in the district court. 45 Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was presented to the trial judge, including extreme violence inflicted by his father and the young man's emotional disturbance, but the judge stated that the court, "in following the law," could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent background." 46 Following the rule announced in Lockett v. Ohio, 47 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that capital sentencers may not exclude mitigating evidence from their consideration. 48 The Court went on to discuss the special mitigating qualities of youth and the vulnerability of the developmental years:
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults. counsel's "duty to investigate the client's life, history, and emotional and psychological make-up" in death penalty cases. 51 He continued:
There must be inquiry into the client's childhood, upbringing, education, relationships, friendships, formative and traumatic experiences, personal psychology, and present feelings. The affirmative case for sparing the defendant's life will be composed in part of information uncovered in the course of this investigation. The importance of this investigation, and the thoroughness and care with which it is conducted, cannot be overemphasized.
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Multiple articles in The Champion, the monthly magazine of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, reiterated these points in the 1980s, and reflected how the experience of capital defense lawyers in diverse locations led them to the same conclusions. 53 Other Champion articles in this period focused on the other myriad complexities of capital defense representation. 
III. THE ARTICULATION OF STANDARDS
Defendants facing capital punishment have always been poor, so the practitioners who have developed skills and expertise in effective capital defense representation have invariably been public defenders, private counsel appointed by the courts, lawyers at nonprofits that filled the void in the harshest jurisdictions, and legions of unpaid pro bono volunteers. Not surprisingly, the first organization to attempt to set out standards in capital defense was the nation's leading association of counsel for the indigent, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA"). 55 The much larger ABA had previously published more general standards relating to criminal defense practice, and these standards already placed important emphasis on the need for investigation. When the ABA published the second edition of its "Standards for Criminal Justice (the Defense Function)" in 1980, Standard 4.4-1 noted: "It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction." Cases" (adopted December 1, 1987, and amended November 16, 1988) ("Standards"). 59 In February 1988, the NLADA referred its Standards to the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants. 60 The Standards were then further circulated within the ABA, which incorporated some concerns expressed by its Criminal Justice Section and changed the name from Standards to Guidelines.
61
The ABA House of Delegates formally adopted the Guidelines at its 1989 Midyear Meeting. 62 When the Guidelines were published by the ABA, each black letter Guideline was explained by a commentary, with reference to supporting authorities. 63 The Commentary cited some of the articles that have been mentioned in this Article, 64 as well as capital trial manuals from multiple jurisdictions, including California, 65 Indiana, 66 Kentucky, 67 Ohio, 68 and Tennessee. 69 Thus, the ABA Guidelines were the product of the dedicated indigent defense professionals, who were representing capital clients effectively, and who freely shared their knowledge and experience through The Champion, training programs, and the manuals that recirculated much of the best material. 70 As the Introduction to the 1989 Guidelines explained: "[T]hey enumerate the minimal resources and practices necessary to provide effective assistance of counsel." 71 They were never meant to be aspirational. As the Introduction to NLADA's original edition said in 1985: "'Should' is used as a mandatory termwhat counsel 'should' do is intended as a standard to be met now, not an ideal to be attained at a later time." 72 The Introduction also noted the reality that "poor defendants in this country who face the ultimate criminal sanction-death-frequently do not receive adequate representation from their government-supplied lawyers." It is critical to demonstrate to our courts how the Guidelines embody not a "Cadillac defense," but the minimum standards developed by successful capital defenders throughout the modern era.
This Article has briefly surveyed the experience that led to the original Guidelines 1990s that contributed to the important revision. 78 New York's brief experiment with capital punishment illustrates how these same influences shaped the performance of an effective capital defense system that modeled many of the practices codified in the 2003 revision.
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When New York enacted a death penalty statute in 1995, the legislation created a Capital Defender Office ("CDO") with a mandate to ensure that capitally charged defendants received effective representation. 80 The newly created office was the first of its kind-that is, the first publicly funded, statewide indigent defense organization dedicated uniquely to the representation of capitally charged clients. 81 The CDO hired staff who had capital experience in other states, including Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Texas. The number of investigators and mitigation specialists on staff was roughly equal to the number of trial lawyers. Every case was staffed with a team of at least two lawyers, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist. While the statute was operational, 877 defendants were charged with potential death-eligible offenses, entitling them to capitally qualified counsel (either CDO staff attorneys or private attorneys who had received specialized training through the CDO, and whom the CDO recommended for court appointment). 82 Only seven death sentences were imposed, and all of them were ultimately overturned. 83 The day-to-day practice of the CDO was not an idiosyncratic invention of its management, but rather a simple attempt to implement the techniques developed by experienced capital defense practitioners all over the country that were the subject of regular presentations at national training programs.
The 108 Welsh White, 109 and Larry Yackle, 110 among others. While most of these authors ultimately had an academic affiliation, the vast majority also had experience as capital practitioners. Some two dozen footnotes cited to defense bar publications, such as The publications relating to mental health issues affecting capital clients.
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The notes also fully incorporated then existing jurisprudence, including many cases in which counsel had been held ineffective for failing to do what the Guidelines said they were supposed to do. 134 These sources are precisely the kinds of contemporaneous supporting authorities specified by Justice Stevens in Padilla v. Kentucky, 135 as reflecting prevailing professional norms-in addition to "American Bar Association standards and the like." 136 Two abiding principles stand out when we view the Guidelines from a historical perspective: the centrality of teamwork as a core tenet in capital defense; and the importance of cooperation among the successive teams that may represent a capital client over the long life of the case. Guideline 10.13(D) discusses trial counsel's obligation to cooperate "with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may be chosen by successor counsel" in post-conviction. 137 In a sense, the cooperation between successive counsel is no more than a temporal extension of the concept of teamwork. Capital representation demands diverse, multidisciplinary teams where the views of every member-past and present-are valued at every stage of litigation, and where everyone shares a continuing commitment to high quality representation when a client's life hangs in the balance.
The Guidelines, as revised in 2003, did not magically emerge from the word processors of agenda-driven activists or the imagination of elitist academics. They reflect nothing more than the collective experience and expertise of the public defenders, court-appointed panel lawyers, underfunded nonprofits, and pro bono volunteers who had effectively litigated capital cases in the 1990s. Effective practice continues to evolve, and, in turn, the lessons of that evolving capital defense practice continue to be reflected in further applications of the Guidelines, such as the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 138 and the efforts of experts to codify best practices in the pages of the Hofstra Law Review and elsewhere. Prevailing norms also continue to evolve. 139 It is a tribute to the whole capital defense bar that we can expect this process to be ongoing as long as the ultimate criminal sanction-execution-remains available in any jurisdiction. 
